This paper develops a model in which market structure is determined endogenously by the choice of intermediation mode. We show that a marketmaking middleman, who adopts the mixture of inventory-holding and platform-making modes, can emerge in a directed search equilibrium.
View Journal Article →Assess the impact of managerial labor market competition on executive incentive contracts using a dynamic contracting model with moral hazard, search frictions, and poaching.
Investigate how middlemen's provision of liquidity support to suppliers affects downstream market distortions.
Analyze the market efficiency implications when e-commerce platforms act as both transaction intermediaries and credit providers via Buy-Now-Pay-Later services.
Download Slides →Examine the welfare consequences of self-preferencing behavior by hybrid platforms that simultaneously operate a marketplace and compete as a first-party seller.
Download Slides →Symposium in Honor of Jean Tirole (2014), Search and Matching Workshop Bristol (2015), EARIE (2015), EEA-ESEM (2016).
Search and Matching Annual Conference (2018), Belgian Financial Research Forum (2018), Queen Mary PhD Workshop (2018), 26th Finance Forum (2018).