I am a PhD candidate in Economics at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute, under the supervision of Makoto Watanabe and Pieter Gautier. My research interests include executive compensation, dynamic contracting, labor search, and topics in industrial organizations such as two-sided market, dynamic pricing, etc.
In my job market paper "Why do big firms pay more for performance?" I document a new fact that comparing executives with the same total compensation, those in bigger firms tend to receive more incentive pays. I give an explanation based on the market incentive. The model features dynamic moral hazard problem and search frictions in the labor market and is estimated on ExecuComp and BoardEX data.
I am on the 2019 job market, and will be available for interviews at the AFA/AEA/ASSA annual meeting in Atlanta January, 2019.
On this site, you can find out more about my research, learn about my teaching activity, read my academic CV. , or get in touch .