Program
Papers and Abstracts
1. Title: TBA
Title and abstract to be announced.
2. Title: TBA
Title and abstract to be announced.
3. Transparency Regulation in Ad Tech
We study ad-tech transparency with competing demand-side providers, an integrated supply-side provider, and endogenous publisher inventory. Under participation-passive forecasts and common small fee caps, supply-side fee disclosure raises both demand-side fees and both platforms' profits while reducing inventory and both user groups' surplus; integrated demand-side fee disclosure alone is neutral. When the integrated platform privately knows its performance, public reporting raises its rival's fee, expected share, and profit but reduces expected inventory relative to a selected pooling opaque benchmark within the certified interior domain. Advertisers can gain or lose. Extensions examine entry, differentiation, and fee verification.
4. Review Informativeness, Sequential Adoption, and Platform Regulation
This paper investigates how online platforms strategically determine the informativeness of consumer reviews and examines the implications for consumer surplus. We develop a two-period model in which early adopters generate reviews that enable late adopters to update their beliefs about unobservable product quality. The platform chooses the informativeness of reviews to maximize sellers’ aggregate profits, taking into account sellers’ endogenous pricing decisions. Greater review informativeness improves consumers’ ability to assess product quality but also affects sellers’ incentives to reduce initial prices to stimulate early adoption and generate more reviews. We show that, under monopoly, the platform always chooses the maximum informativeness level, although this level may be excessive from the perspective of consumer surplus. Under seller competition, the platform may instead choose either the minimum or maximum informativeness level, resulting in excessive or insufficient informativeness relative to the consumer-optimal level. These findings demonstrate that enhancing review informativeness does not necessarily benefit consumers, as its informational benefits may be offset by changes in equilibrium prices. Our analysis highlights the importance of accounting for sellers’ endogenous pricing responses when designing regulations governing online review systems.
5. Bargaining under Competitive Constraints
Abstract: To be announced.
6. Merger Control in a Changing World
How should merger control account for future changes in market conditions? We study horizontal merger policy in the presence of industry-wide cost and demand shocks, under both homogeneous-goods Cournot competition and differentiated-products price competition with CES and multinomial logit demand. We obtain two main results. First, adverse deterministic shocks increase industry concentration but nevertheless call for more permissive merger policy. Second, uncertainty has markedly different policy implications depending on the decision criterion. Under a cautious maxmin approach, greater uncertainty calls for more lenient merger control. Under a risk-neutral expected-consumer-surplus criterion, by contrast, greater uncertainty tends to demand stricter merger control.