Song-Dynasty Ink-Wash Chinese Mountain and River Landscape

Fudan IO Workshop 复旦产业组织研讨会

Shanghai, December 22, 2026

Keynote Speakers: Chengsi Wang (Monash), Yu Zhou (SUSTech) & Nicolas Schutz (Mannheim)

Organizer: Bo Hu (School of Economics, Fudan University) · Hosted by Center for Game Theory and Quantitative Economics & Institute of World Economy, Fudan University

Program

Morning Session
Chair: Bo Hu (Fudan University)
09:15 – 09:55
Muxin Li, Shanghai Institute for Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Sciences (SIMIS)
09:55 – 10:35
Yang Yang, Tsinghua University
10:35 – 11:05
Coffee Break
11:05 – 11:55Keynote
Chengsi Wang, Monash University
12:00 – 14:00
Lunch (Commune)
Afternoon Session
Chair: Ting Li (Fudan University)
14:00 – 14:40
14:40 – 15:30Keynote
Yu Zhou, Southern University of Science and Technology
15:30 – 15:55
Coffee Break
15:55 – 16:45Keynote
Nicolas Schutz, University of Mannheim
17:30 / 18:00
Workshop Dinner (On-Campus, by invitation only)

Papers and Abstracts

1. Title: TBA

Muxin Li (Shanghai Institute for Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Sciences)

Title and abstract to be announced.

2. Title: TBA

Yang Yang (Tsinghua University)

Title and abstract to be announced.

3. Transparency Regulation in Ad Tech

Chengsi Wang (Monash University) · Keynote

We study ad-tech transparency with competing demand-side providers, an integrated supply-side provider, and endogenous publisher inventory. Under participation-passive forecasts and common small fee caps, supply-side fee disclosure raises both demand-side fees and both platforms' profits while reducing inventory and both user groups' surplus; integrated demand-side fee disclosure alone is neutral. When the integrated platform privately knows its performance, public reporting raises its rival's fee, expected share, and profit but reduces expected inventory relative to a selected pooling opaque benchmark within the certified interior domain. Advertisers can gain or lose. Extensions examine entry, differentiation, and fee verification.

4. Review Informativeness, Sequential Adoption, and Platform Regulation

Cong Pan (Kyoto Sangyo University)
with Fuyuki Saruta

This paper investigates how online platforms strategically determine the informativeness of consumer reviews and examines the implications for consumer surplus. We develop a two-period model in which early adopters generate reviews that enable late adopters to update their beliefs about unobservable product quality. The platform chooses the informativeness of reviews to maximize sellers’ aggregate profits, taking into account sellers’ endogenous pricing decisions. Greater review informativeness improves consumers’ ability to assess product quality but also affects sellers’ incentives to reduce initial prices to stimulate early adoption and generate more reviews. We show that, under monopoly, the platform always chooses the maximum informativeness level, although this level may be excessive from the perspective of consumer surplus. Under seller competition, the platform may instead choose either the minimum or maximum informativeness level, resulting in excessive or insufficient informativeness relative to the consumer-optimal level. These findings demonstrate that enhancing review informativeness does not necessarily benefit consumers, as its informational benefits may be offset by changes in equilibrium prices. Our analysis highlights the importance of accounting for sellers’ endogenous pricing responses when designing regulations governing online review systems.

5. Bargaining under Competitive Constraints

Yu Zhou (Southern University of Science and Technology) · Keynote
with Lijun Pan and David Perez-Castrillo

Abstract: To be announced.

6. Merger Control in a Changing World

Nicolas Schutz (University of Mannheim) · Keynote
with Volker Nocke and Martin Peitz

How should merger control account for future changes in market conditions? We study horizontal merger policy in the presence of industry-wide cost and demand shocks, under both homogeneous-goods Cournot competition and differentiated-products price competition with CES and multinomial logit demand. We obtain two main results. First, adverse deterministic shocks increase industry concentration but nevertheless call for more permissive merger policy. Second, uncertainty has markedly different policy implications depending on the decision criterion. Under a cautious maxmin approach, greater uncertainty calls for more lenient merger control. Under a risk-neutral expected-consumer-surplus criterion, by contrast, greater uncertainty tends to demand stricter merger control.